UprootSecurity
Book a demo

A pentest on every deploy not every year

HACKBOT

The pentest that runs itself, every time you ship.

An autonomous agent that attacks your live app like a human would reading the frontend, probing auth, then chaining small findings into the one that breaches. On every deploy. The annual PDF is obsolete.

Run HackBot on your appWatch a live scan
Every deployScan cadence
7-phaseAgent
VerifiedFindings only
HB
HackBot · api.acme.com

scan_run · 6m 18s · 142 endpoints · 3 critical · 7 high

Attacking

Frontend

Recon

BOLA

Server

Notes

Chain

Report

HackBot agent

$

frontend · parsed app bundle · 187 routes, 24 API hosts

09:14:02

$

recon · fuzzed /api/* · 142 reachable, 9 undocumented

09:14:31

$

bola · /api/users/:id returns peer records · CRIT

09:16:12

$

server · SSRF in image_proxy → 169.254.169.254 reachable · CRIT

09:18:47

$

notes · leaked admin_token in /api/users/42 body · lead saved

09:19:30

$

chain · bolaadmin_tokenSSRFcustomer PII · verified

09:20:11

$

report · 1 critical chain, 3 standalone crits, 7 high · PR drafted

09:20:20

Chained exploitCRIT

bola → token → ssrf → exfil

step 1 · bola

GET /api/users/41

step 2 · token

admin_token leaked

step 3 · ssrf+pivot

/exports.json → PII

step 1 · bola

GET /api/users/41

step 2 · token

admin_token leaked

step 3 · ssrf+pivot

/exports.json → PII

Why the annual pentest is broken

You ship 40 times a week. You test for attackers once a year.

A traditional pentest is a snapshot of an app that no longer exists by the time the report lands. HackBot closes the gap by making offensive testing a build step continuous, autonomous, and tied to the exact change that introduced the risk.

01Deploy

Every ship triggers a scan.

A merge to main or a deploy webhook kicks off HackBot automatically. New routes in the diff become new attack surface the same minute they go live.

Trigger on deploy
02Attack

Seven phases, like a real operator.

The agent reasons through frontend analysis, recon, access-control probing, server-side testing, and lead-gathering adapting its next move to what the last one revealed.

Agent autonomous
03Chain

Small bugs become a real breach.

The differentiator: HackBot composes low-severity findings into the multi-step exploit that actually reaches your data then verifies the chain end to end before reporting it.

Output verified chain
04Fix

A finding you can act on, with a PR.

Each finding ships with the request, the payload, the blast radius, and a suggested fix often as a drafted PR. It re-tests on the next deploy to confirm the fix held.

Remediation PR drafted
What makes HackBot different

Not a scanner. An operator that chains.

Vulnerability scanners list problems. HackBot reasons like an attacker: it gathers leads, connects them, and proves the path to impact so you fix the breach, not triage a thousand low-severity lines.

1
Frontend analysisParses the app bundle to enumerate routes, API hosts, and auth flows.
2
ReconFuzzes and maps the live API — including undocumented endpoints.
3
BOLA / access controlTests object-level authorization across real ID graphs.
4
Server-side testingProbes SSRF, injection, and business-logic flaws.
5
Notes & leadsSaves leaked tokens, secrets, and hints for later steps.
6
ChainingComposes leads into a verified, multi-step exploit path.
7
ReportWrites up each finding with request, payload, and fix.
The seven-phase agent

A methodology, not a wordlist.

HackBot works like a skilled human tester each phase informs the next. It reads your frontend, finds the real (and undocumented) API surface, then probes the flaws scanners miss because they need reasoning, not signatures.

Frontend analysis to map the app as users and code see it

BOLA / IDOR and broken-auth testing across real object graphs

Server-side: SSRF, injection, and logic flaws, with lead-tracking

Read the methodology
CRITICALBOLA → token → SSRF → PIIchain · verified
EntryGET /api/users/41
Impactcustomer PII export reachable
ControlsSOC 2 CC6.1 · OWASP API1
# step 1 — peer record via id swap
GET /api/users/41 Authorization: Bearer …
← 200 {"admin_token":"ey…"}
# step 3 — ssrf pivot to metadata
GET /image_proxy?url=169.254.169.254
Open fix PR
View full chain
Export PoC
A finding you can act on

The request, the payload, the blast radius, the fix.

Every finding is reproducible and verified no "potential" or "informational" noise. You get the exact request, the data it reached, the controls it violated, and a suggested fix, often as a drafted PR.

Reproducible PoC: the literal request and payload

Blast radius: what data or system the exploit actually reached

Suggested fix as a PR; re-verified on the next deploy

See a sample finding
GH
HackBot · scan historyapi.acme.com
09:20Z
HB
deploy 8f3a21c1 crit chain · 3 crit · 7 high · PR #4218
Action
yest.
HB
deploy 7c1d09anew route /api/exports · 1 high
Triaged
2d
HB
deploy 4b8e2f1re-verified #4201 fix · held
Clean
3d
HB
deploy 2a9f7c3no new surface · 0 findings
Clean
Continuous, not quarterly

Wired into your pipeline, not your calendar.

HackBot runs on every deploy and tracks your attack surface over time. A new route ships today, it's tested today; a fix merged this morning is re-verified this afternoon a living view of exploitability, with the evidence trail to prove it.

Triggered by merge-to-main or a deploy webhook

Diff-aware: new and changed routes prioritized automatically

Each scan is signed evidence pentest coverage your auditor accepts

See pipeline setup
ST
staging.acme.comfull-force · destructive allowed
Aggressive
PR
api.acme.com (prod)read-only · rate-limited
Safe mode
EX
payments.acme.comexcluded from scope
Out of scope
LG
action log14,902 requests · all recorded
Logged
Safe by design

Aggressive on staging. Careful in production.

You define the scope, environments, and blast radius. HackBot respects rate limits, honors a destructive-action allowlist, and runs full-force on staging while staying read-only in prod with every action logged.

Per-environment aggression and destructive-action controls

Scoped to the hosts and routes you authorize nothing else

Full action log; HackBot's own activity is itself evidence

Read the safety model

What continuous offensive testing surfaces.

40×
More scans per year than a typical annual pentest engagement
6m
Median full scan run against a mid-size API surface
0
"Informational" filler findings verified or it isn't reported
Classes of flaw HackBot hunts

The bugs that need reasoning, not signatures.

HackBot focuses on the vulnerability classes that scanners systematically miss the ones that depend on understanding your app's logic and chaining context together.

A1
Broken object authBOLA / IDOR

Accessing other users' objects by manipulating identifiers the #1 API risk, and invisible to signature scanners.

ID-swap across real object graphstested
Tenant isolation breakstested
Mass-assignment escalationtested
SS
Server-sideSSRF · injection

Server-side request forgery, injection, and deserialization the flaws that reach internal infrastructure.

SSRF to cloud metadatatested
SQL / NoSQL / command injectiontested
Unsafe deserializationtested
AU
Auth & sessionbroken auth

Flaws in authentication, token handling, and session management that let an attacker become someone else.

JWT / token validation gapstested
Privilege escalation pathstested
Leaked secrets in responsestested
BL
Business logiclogic flaws

Abuses of intended functionality the flaws no wordlist contains because they're unique to your app.

Workflow / state-machine abusetested
Price / quantity tamperingtested
Race conditionstested
EX
Exposuresurface drift

New attack surface introduced by a deploy undocumented endpoints, debug routes, and forgotten test handlers.

Undocumented API endpointsmapped
Debug / admin routes in prodflagged
Verbose error leakageflagged
CH
Chainsthe headline

The whole point: composing the above into a verified, end-to-end path from a low-severity bug to real impact.

Multi-step exploit assemblyverified
End-to-end impact proofverified
Reproducible PoC per chainexported

When we evaluated our options for compliance and securing our systems, we found that UprootSecurity's compliance and security model aligned perfectly with our needs. It gave our team real-time visibility into the end-to-end process, saving our engineers hundreds of hours of manual effort.

YN
Yogesh NarayanCTO
1
Critical chain caught the same week the code shipped
Common questions

What teams ask before pointing HackBot at prod.

Autonomous offensive testing against a live app raises real questions. Here’s how HackBot stays safe and useful.

Is it safe to run against production?+

Yes, with guardrails. In production it runs read-only and rate-limited, with a destructive-action allowlist you control full-force on staging, conservative in prod. Every request is logged.

How is this different from a vulnerability scanner?+

Scanners match signatures and produce long lists of mostly-low findings. HackBot reasons like an operator gathering leads across phases and chaining them into a verified, end-to-end exploit. It reports the breach path, not a thousand "informational" lines.

Does it replace a human pentest entirely?+

It replaces the repetitive coverage you’d otherwise get once a year, on every deploy. Many teams keep a periodic human engagement for deep, creative work and use HackBot to catch regressions between them it raises the floor continuously.

Will it create noise for my engineers?+

No findings are verified before reporting, deduplicated against open issues, and routed to the owning service with a reproducible PoC and a suggested fix. Your team sees confirmed breaches, not a triage queue.

Does a HackBot scan count as pentest evidence?+

Each scan is signed and filed in your evidence library with scope, findings, and remediation trail satisfying the periodic-pentest controls in SOC 2, ISO 27001, and PCI. Because it’s continuous, your coverage is never a year stale.

Point HackBot at your app. Watch it chain.

Authorize a scope, connect your deploy webhook, and get a verified findings report on the next release with the requests, the chain, and the fix.

Run HackBotBook a live scan

On every deploy

Triggered by merge-to-main or a webhook.

Verified findings only

Reproducible PoC, no informational noise.

Real exploit chaining

Low-severity bugs composed into the actual breach.

Counts as evidence

Signed scans satisfy periodic-pentest controls.